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While no longer common in the private sector, most public sector employers offer retiree health insurance
(RHI) as a retirement benefit to their employees.  While these plans are thought to be an important
tool for employers to attract, retain, motivate, and ultimately retire workers, they represent a large
and growing cost.  This paper reviews what is currently known about RHI in the public sector, while
highlighting many important unanswered research questions.  The analysis is informed by detailed
data from states on their liabilities associated with RHI, which were produced in accordance with the
2004 Government Accounting Standards Board Rule 45 (GASB 45).  We consider the extent of the
unfunded liabilities states face and explore what factors may explain the variation in liabilities across
states.  The importance and sustainability of RHI plans in the public sector ultimately depends on how
workers view and value this post-retirement benefit, yet little is known about how RHI directly impacts
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State and local governments have historically provided generous retirement benefits to 
career employees.  Most full-time public sector employees are eligible for employer-provided 
health insurance in retirement, given that they have achieved some minimum years of service 
requirements.  This benefit can represent a significant fraction of the total compensation that an 
employee receives.  In general, retiree health insurance (RHI) plans in the public sector allow 
retired employees to remain in the same health plan as active workers.  From the public 
employer’s perspective, RHI is an important benefit that helps to attract, retain, motivate, and 
ultimately retire quality workers.  However, the cost of these plans represents a large and 
increasing percentage of total compensation in many states and localities.  
The future of public sector retiree health insurance will depend on the ability of 
governments to continue to provide this benefit in the face of rising costs and aging populations.  
At the same time, determining how public sector employees view and value this benefit is 
essential to understanding how public sector labor markets may respond to changes in retirement 
benefits.  Despite its significance, much is still unknown about the responses to the economic 
incentives inherent in RHI plans in the public sector and the impact of providing RHI on the 
financial status of state and local governments. 
This paper examines the landscape of public sector retiree health plans in the United 
States.  Much of this discussion is based on the state-level actuarial reports produced in 
accordance with GASB 45.  We begin by describing the cost and funding status of state RHI 
plans.  The importance of the economic assumptions used in calculating the plans’ liabilities and 
the implications of using prefunding versus pay-as-you-go systems are examined.  The ways in 
which the plans offered by state governments differ are described and the factors that are 




with public sector pension plans, we ask why so few retiree health plans are prefunded when all 
defined benefit pension plans are backed by trust funds.   
We then conduct an analysis of how workers value this benefit and its role in the public 
sector labor market.  The paper concludes by considering the future of RHI provision in the 
public sector.  We consider how public employers might respond if health insurance costs 
continue to rise faster than the general rate of inflation thus increasing the financial burden of 
this benefit.  Similarly, since all public RHI plans are linked to Medicare, future legislation that 
reduces the generosity of Medicare or increases the age of eligibility for this national health plan 
would directly increase the cost of RHI provided by state and local governments.  In addition to 
providing a review of the current state of research regarding public sector RHI, this paper 
highlights several important issues that require further study. 
 
I.  Reported Liabilities Associated with Retiree Health Plans in the Public Sector 
While RHI coverage is declining in the private sector of the U.S. economy, all states and 
many local governments provide some type of health insurance for their retired employees.
1  
State and local governments began extending health insurance to their retirees in the 1960s and 
1970s, which coincides with the adoption of these plans by large, unionized firms in the private 
sector following the establishment of Medicare in 1966.  While Medicare provides public health 
insurance to individuals age 65 and older, there is no stop loss feature so there is demand for 
supplementary coverage for retirees that are Medicare-eligible.  At the same time, earlier 
retirements led to demand for health insurance coverage for retirees younger than age 65, a 
population that has more significant health care needs than average.  In part due to adverse 




age 65 tend to have high premiums.  Thus, retiree health insurance has become a valuable benefit 
for workers.
2  Clark and Morrill (2010 forthcoming) describe the basic structure of retiree health 
plans for state employees and the cost to the retiree of continued participation in the plan (also 
see US GAO, 2007, 2009).   
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 45 (GASB 45), which 
was approved in 2004, requires public employers to produce an actuarial statement assessing the 
financial status of retiree health programs using generally accepted accounting standards as set 
forth by GASB.   States must report the present discounted value of the future liability of health 
care promises to current workers as these benefits are accrued along with the present value of 
these promises to current retirees.
3  Prior to this rule, the long term obligations of these promises 
were not widely recognized.   
GASB 45 statements include the actuarial accrued liabilities (AAL), the assets contained 
in any dedicated trust fund, the unfunded actuarial accrued liabilities (UAAL), the annual 
required contributions (ARC), and the current method of financing for these retiree health 
insurance plans.  The UAAL is the difference between AAL and any assets that the employer has 
set aside in an irrevocable trust.  If the plan is completely pay-as-you-go, the UAAL is equal to 
the AAL.  The ARC is the normal cost of the retiree health plan plus the amount needed to 
amortize the existing unfunded liability over a 30 year period.  It is important to remember that 
public employers are not required, in any legal sense, to contribute the ARC.  Instead, the ARC 
indicates the annual contribution by the employer that is needed to move the plan toward full 
funding.  States can continue to use pay-as-you-go funding for these plans if they choose.  ARCs 
and UAALs have been growing over time in most states and are now a major public policy issue 




The actuarial calculations conducted in accordance with GASB 45 are based on the 
parameters of the RHI plan, the number of workers and retirees covered by the plan, and the 
economic and demographic assumptions used by the actuaries regarding medical cost growth, 
discount rates, enrollment rates, etc.  Some states have established trust funds to facilitate the 
pre-funding of future payments, which will reduce the fraction of the accrued liability that is 
deemed unfunded.  Over the past few years, a series of papers and reports have called attention 
to the large and growing unfunded liabilities associated with public retiree health plans (Pew 
Center on the States, 2007, 2010; Zion and Varshney, 2007; Standard & Poor’s, 2007; Goldman 
Sachs, 2007).  Using data from state Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR), these 
studies provided the public the first assessment of the hidden liabilities associated with retiree 
health plans provided by state and local governments.  Estimates of the unfunded liabilities 
ranged from $500 billion to $1.5 trillion.   
Clark and Morrill (2010 forthcoming) report figures taken directly from the actuarial 
statements prepared by the states in compliance with GASB 45.  By examining the actuarial 
statements, one can note the assumptions imbedded in the projections, such as the discount rates 
and the assumed inflation rates used in calculating liabilities.  The total unfunded liabilities for 
the states as reported in the GASB 45 actuarial statements is over $400 billion.  Table 1 shows 
the estimated UAALs and the ARCs for state plans as reported by the Pew Center on the States 
(2010) and in Clark and Morrill (2010 forthcoming).  These data reveal that the magnitude of the 
unfunded liabilities associated with these programs varies substantially across the states ranging 
from less than $50 million to over $60 billion.   




Differences between the values reported for the individual states in Pew (2010), which 
uses the CAFRs data, and in Clark and Morrill (2010 forthcoming), which uses the individual 
state actuarial reports, are possibly due to the authors using different years of data or to the 
inclusion of additional RHI plans besides those for general state employees.  Note that the data in 
most studies of retiree health liabilities do not include the additional liabilities associated with 
retiree health plans at the local level and many state plans also do not cover public school 
teachers.
4  A major limitation in determining the total unfunded liability of public sector RHI 
plans is the lack of a national data base that includes all state, local, and teacher plans.   
 
 
II.  Differences across States in Retiree Health Insurance Plans 
To produce a report in accordance with the GASB 45 rule, public employers must 
calculate the present value of their promise to pay RHI to all current and future retirees.  The 
present value of benefits based on current programs is determined by projecting the life 
expectancy of all workers, both retired and active, and the retirement behavior of active 
employees.  These projections also incorporate the rising cost of health insurance provision.  A 
discount rate is used to convert the stream of payments over the subsequent thirty years to a 
present value of the liabilities associated with the state retiree health plans.  GASB 45 requires 
that the actuarial statements assume that the current provisions of the retiree health plan will 
remain in effect. The reports produced in compliance with GASB 45 include the actuarial 
calculations based on these and additional assumptions.   
The following discussion focuses on the state-level actuarial reports.  To explore the 
origins of the differences across states in liabilities, we combine the information gathered from 




some secondary sources to help better frame the relative liabilities.  Table 2 reports the UAAL 
again for reference and then includes a measure of UAAL per capita for each of the states.
5  
Comparing these two values clearly shows that even after adjusting for population size, there are 
substantial differences across the states in their retiree health liabilities.  For example, states with 
the lowest UAAL per capita include North Dakota ($48), Indiana ($70), Arizona ($73), Iowa 
($74), and South Dakota ($97).  In comparison, states with the highest UAAL per capita are New 
Jersey ($7,950), Hawaii ($7,635), Alaska ($4,689), Louisiana ($4,361), and West Virginia 
($4,298).  Thus, the UAAL per capita of the two highest states is 100 times the UAAL per capita 
of the three lowest states.    
[Table 2] 
Table 2 also presents several other important aspects of the retiree health plans of the 
various states that influence the accrued liabilities of the states.  These factors are whether 
teachers are included in the same plan that covers general state employees, the percent of the 
premium paid by the employer, and the discount rate used to calculate the present value of future 
insurance costs.  Because many states report the sensitivity of the liability levels to the 
assumptions used in the actuarial calculations, one can explore how significant these 
assumptions are to the unfunded liability levels of individual states. 
i.  Retiree Health Insurance Plan Coverage  
An important component of RHI plans is the extent of coverage.  Our discussion here 
focuses on plans that cover general state employees.  In many states, these same plans also cover 
public school teachers.  Column 3 of Table 2 indicates that 33 of these state plans include public 
school teachers while the others do not.  Some large states like New York, New Jersey, North 




Ohio do not.  Broader coverage should be associated with larger liabilities, all else equal.  The 
inclusion of teachers is one reason why some states have higher UAALs.  For example, the New 
Jersey amount includes teachers and local employees in addition to state employees, while the 
California UAAL is based on a plan that does not cover these types of workers. 
In addition to variation in the state policies regarding the inclusion of teachers and local 
workers in the state plan, as described further below state plans also differ in their years of 
service requirements, eligibility ages, and integration with federal health insurance plans.  For 
example, some public sector employers terminate the participation of retirees in the health plan 
at age 65 when individuals become eligible for Medicare.  In addition, all plans require that the 
retiree enroll in Medicare as soon as they become eligible to do so (Clark and Morrill 2010 
forthcoming; US GAO 2007, 2009). 
Research Question 1.  In evaluating the total RHI obligations of a state, should all local and 
teacher plans be included?  In other words, are the states ultimately responsible for the RHI 
liabilities of teacher-only and other local government plans?   
 
Research Question 2.  Within states that have separate state, local, and/or teacher plans, how do 
teacher-only and local government RHI plans compare to the RHI plans offered to state 
employees in terms of generosity and funding levels? 
 
ii.  Generosity of RHI across the States 
The generosity of RHI plans can differ along several dimensions.  For example, some 
state plans require fewer years of service before an employee would be eligible for fully 
subsidized health insurance.
6  Plans also differ in the extent of subsidization (percent of the 
premium paid by the state), as well as other forms of cost sharing such as the deductible and co-
payment requirements. At a minimum, though, all states allow retirees to buy into the state health 
insurance plan.  While there is a tremendous amount of variation in the characteristics of any 




key characteristic determining the generosity of the plans due to the nature of how the present 
value of benefits are calculated.  The difference in the lifetime present value of health insurance 
coverage at retirement with the retiree paying no premium compared to the retiree paying the 
entire premium could be over $200,000 (Fidelity Investments, 2009). 
GASB 45 identifies two types of subsidies, explicit and implicit.  An explicit subsidy 
occurs when the state pays some (or all) of the premium for the health insurance.  An implicit 
subsidy occurs when the risk pool used to determine the monthly premium for health insurance 
for retirees includes both active and retired employees.  Including active and retired employees 
in one risk pool means that the premium charged to retirees is lower than the premium that 
would be assessed if the plan included only retirees (while the cost for active workers is therefore 
higher than it would otherwise be).  The difference in cost between the blend premium and the 
retiree-only premium is an implicit subsidy.  Under GASB 45, this type of implicit subsidy must 
be reported as a liability of the retiree health plan.  Thus, even those employers that require the 
retiree to pay 100 percent of the premium will have some liability associated with allowing 
retirees to purchase health insurance as part of their general health insurance plan.   
In addition to higher per person costs, employers with more generous RHI benefits must 
assume a higher “take-up” rate when making calculations of future costs.  More generous plans 
will be more attractive relative to those in the private health insurance market or insurance plans 
offered through a spouse’s employer.  Therefore, a generous health plan not only costs states 
more per retiree that claims the benefit, but the AAL will also reflect the higher number of 
retirees expected to utilize the plan.  GAO (2007) divides the states into four categories: states 
that pay the entire insurance premium, states that pay 50 to 99 percent of the premium, states that 




This assessment ignores the implicit subsidy associated with these plans.   This measure of the 
generosity of each state plan is presented in Column 4 of Table 2.
7    
The impact of state paid premiums is clearly shown in Figure 1 which illustrates the 
mean UAAL per capita for states in the each of four generosity categories shown in Table 2.  
States that require retirees to pay the entire premium only have liabilities associated with the 
implicit subsidy.  The mean UAAL per capita for these states is only $170 million.  States that 
pay a small proportion of the premium (1 to 49 percent) have a mean UAAL per capita that is 
very similar to those states requiring the retiree to pay the entire premium.  In stark comparison, 
the mean UAAL per capita is $1,998 for those states paying 50 to 99 percent of the premium and 
$2,781 for the states that pay 100 percent of the premium.  This figure illustrates the importance 
of this generosity parameter in determining the liabilities associated with state retiree health 
plans.   
[Figure 1] 
Research Question 3.  Are there other dimensions of RHI plan generosity besides the 
subsidization of the premium that significantly influence the magnitudes of AALs?  What 
aspects of the RHI plans themselves may be altered to make costs for public sector employers 
more manageable? 
 
Research Question 4.  Why have some states chosen to pay the entire RHI premium while other 
states simply allow retirees access to their health plans?  
 
 
iii.  Assumed Trends in Medical Inflation 
In the actuarial statements, the health care cost trend rate is typically defined as the rate 
of change in per capita health claims costs over time as a result of factors such as medical 
inflation, utilization of health care services, plan design, and technological developments.  The 
rate of assumed increase in the per capita cost of medical care is another determinant of the 




provided health care has been increasing at annual rates in excess of 10 percent.
8   Virtually all of 
the actuarial reports for state RHI plans assume that the medical cost rate will decline from its 
current level of 10 to 14 percent per year to a rate of around five percent.  Of course, lower 
assumed rates of inflation result in lower liabilities and annual required contributions thus 
making the state’s financial position look rosier.   
As with the sensitivity of estimates to discount rates, some of the actuarial statements 
illustrate the impact of variations in the rate of increase in per capita medical costs.  These 
figures are presented in Table 3.  For example, Hawaii reports a UAAL of 9.7 billion dollars 
using an assumption that the current rate of medical cost inflation falls from the current 11 
percent to only 5 percent in 2113.  Then, the report states that an increase of one percentage point 
in the health care inflation rate would raise the UAAL to $11.6 billion, an increase of almost 20 
percent.   The other states that report the results of such an exercise have similar patterns.  
Therefore, we must conclude that if the rate of inflation for health care were to continue at its 
current rate, all projections of state UAALs and ARCs would be significantly higher.   Since all 
the reports have adopted similar assumptions on medical care inflation, this assumption should 
not affect the relative values of UAAL across the states.  However, the UAALs calculated based 
on lower health care inflation rates will underestimate the size of the true liabilities if health care 
costs continue to rise at their current rates.   
[Table 3] 
Research Question 6. What is a reasonable assumption concerning the rate of medical price 
increase that should be assumed in the actuarial reports?  Should actuaries be required to show 
sensitivity to medical price inflation in these reports? 
 




GASB 45 allows public employers to use a discount rate that is consistent with the return 
on the “investments that are expected to be used to finance the payment of benefits.”  For states 
that do not prefund their retiree health plans, the assumed discount rate should approximate the 
yield on the portfolio of the state’s general assets from which funds are drawn to pay for the 
health benefits for retirees.  However, if the state establishes an irrevocable trust to partially or 
wholly finance its RHI, a rate consistent with the return on these investments can be used in the 
actuarial reports.   The GASB standards allow partially funded plans to adopt a blended rate 
between four and seven to nine percent to calculate their accrued liabilities.  The final column of 
Table 2 indicates the discount rate used by each state in calculating their UAAL.  In comparison 
to public pension plans, most states are currently using lower discount rates for determining the 
liabilities associated with their RHI plans, and this follows from the funding strategy chosen by 
the state.  The actuarial reports of seventeen states are based on a discount rate of 4.5 percent, 
another eleven states use 4.0 to 4.25 percent, and four states adopted discount rates of 3.0 to 3.85 
percent.   
Table 4 indicates the states that have existing funds and the funding ratio for these plans.  
Based on their actuarial statements all other states do not have any assets set aside for the 
payment of RHI.  Thus, most of these plans are funded on a pay-as-you-go basis using current 
revenues to pay current premiums for health insurance for retired workers.  This is a substantially 
different funding strategy compared to that used by the states to fund their pension plans.   
[Table 4] 
Many of the state actuarial statements show the impact of assuming a higher discount 
rate.  This sensitivity analysis is most often included in the reports of states considering the 




reduction in UAAL and ARC associated with using a higher rate is discussed in the reports as 
being an advantage of establishing a trust for these plans and a beginning to funding future health 
care costs.  These alternative calculations are shown in Table 5 for all of the states that reported 
the sensitivity of the UAAL to changes in the discount rate. Typically, the statements report the 
UAAL using a discount rate of four to five percent which is consistent with the current pay-as-
you-go status of these plans.  The consultants often illustrate the impact of a movement toward 
full funding by incorporating a discount rate of approximately 8 percent into the calculations.   
[Table 5] 
Since most public employers do not have dedicated trust funds for these health plans, 
they tend to use discount rates of between 3.5 and 5.0 percent.  Thus, in general, estimated 
liabilities for RHI are likely to be more realistic than the comparable estimates for public pension 
plans.  However, a reading of the actuarial statements prepared in response to GASB 45 shows 
that many of the statements indicate that if the government were to begin funding their plan they 
could use a higher discount rate and reduce their reported liabilities and annual required 
contribution.
9  The impression is clearly given that if only the state were to move toward 
funding, their health liabilities would be dramatically reduced. 
In the pension literature, there is currently a debate on the appropriateness of using these 
higher discount rates (see papers in Anderson and Mitchell, 2009, Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2010, 
and Munnell et al., 2010).  This debate is primarily between the actuaries who use GASB 
guidelines and economists who favor using real market interest rates.
10  Financial economists 
argue that a more realistic approach to determining the present value of pension liabilities would 
be to use the rate of return to bonds, a rate closer to four percent.  The basic argument is that the 




similar to a bond.  Thus, their value (in this case the present value of future health care costs) 
should be determined using the interest rates on bonds offered by the government, i.e., the 
current yield on state bonds.  Following this line of reasoning, the appropriate discount rate 
would be in the range of four percent whether or not the state chose to prefund their RHI.  
Similar arguments could be made concerning the discount rates used to value RHI.  Although a 
major difference between RHI and pension plans is the limited use of trust funds to support RHI 
plans.  
Research Question 5.  What is the appropriate discount rate to use in evaluating retiree health 
insurance plans? Should the type of funding matter in the evaluation of liabilities? 
 
 
v.  Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Economic theory and political economy suggest that the total cost of RHI plans and their 
generosity will be influenced by state-level environmental factors such as the population size, the 
size of the state budget, the absolute and relative size of the public sector in a state, the level of 
unionization, the commitments to other employee benefits, and the earnings of state employees.  
In addition, reported liabilities will be directly affected by the plan characteristics and 
methodological assumptions, whether the teachers are included in the plans, and the proportion 
of the premium paid by the state.  Results of a multivariate regression model of UAAL per capita 
are presented in Table 6. 
[Table 6] 
Larger states will have greater accrued liabilities simply due to having more employees 
and retiree, so the dependent variable considered here is the UAAL per capita, that is, UAAL 
divided by the state population.
11  However, larger states may also benefit from economies of 




from the state and local government sourcebook.
12  The budget is a measure of the overall size of 
the state government and it is anticipated that this would be positively correlated with RHI 
liabilities, but would not necessarily influence the cost per capita of these programs.  We find no 
relationship between UAAL per capita and log state budget in the regression, indicating that 
larger states face greater RHI liabilities for their retiree health plans but population adjusted 
liabilities are unaffected by the size of the state and its budget.  Note that instead considering 
population rather than state budget yields a similar conclusion, and that population size and state 
budget are too collinear to include both in the regression model. 
The share of workers in the public sector might also affect plan costs as states with more 
public sector employees will have higher labor costs compared to similar states with fewer 
government workers.  In addition, the voting power of this larger government workforce may 
result in the state providing more generous benefits.  A higher degree of unionization among 
public sector employees could also result in more generous employee benefits.  Our empirical 
results are consistent with both of these predictions showing positive and significant coefficients 
on share of labor force in the public sector and public sector unionization.
13  
The regression also includes a measure of the average salary of state employees.
14   Also 
included in the model is a measure of the funding status of the pension plan for state employees 
in order to determine whether states that prudently fund their pension plans also have taken steps 
to have low unfunded liabilities associated with their retiree health plans.  Neither of these 
variables is found to be significantly related to UAAL per capita. 
Next, we consider how plan characteristics and calculation assumptions predict relative 
UAAL per capita.  The discount rate has the expected negative impact on the measure of 




used to estimate accrued liabilities is associated with a 21 percent lower UAAL per capita.  In 
addition to the mechanical effect of the discount rate discussed above, this coefficient may also 
reflect the increased incentive of states with high levels of unfunded liabilities to report the lower 
liability levels associated with using higher discount rates.  The indicator variable for whether 
the state includes teachers in the calculation of the liability has the anticipated positive sign but is 
not statistically significant.   
The states are sorted into the four categories by the proportion of the insurance premium 
paid by the state.  Figure 1 demonstrated that those states that pay 50 to 99 percent and those that 
pay 100 percent of the premium have much higher retiree health liabilities relative to states that 
pay less than 50 percent of the premium.  In Table 6, we see that states that pay 100 percent of 
the premium have a 274 percent higher UAAL per capita than those states that require the retiree 
to pay 100 percent of the premium.  Similarly, states that pay 50 to 99 percent of the premium 
have around 242 percent higher UAAL per capita.   
Although the regression results are consistent with predictions and clearly indicate a large 
and important role for the health plan generosity in determining the burden of retiree health 
insurance liabilities, many important questions remain.  The considerable variation in plan 
liabilities across states cannot be explained solely by differences in population, public sector 
labor force characteristics, or assumptions made in calculating the future liabilities.  The choices 
that state governments make regarding the characteristics of their RHI plan are a key component 
to understanding why liabilities and costs differ so dramatically across states.   
Research Question 7. Many states are facing substantial unfunded liabilities associated with 
retiree health plans, while other states appear to have smaller, more manageable UAALs.   Why 
are there such striking differences in the size of unfunded liabilities?  Why do the characteristics 
of the RHI plans differ so much across the states, especially in comparison to other forms of 






III.   Is RHI a Liability or a Promise? 
Given the high levels of liabilities some states face, it is natural to consider whether states 
must truly fulfill the promise of future health insurance for retirees, or whether they may reduce 
benefits at some future time.  The US GAO (2008) reports that all states have legal protections 
for their retirement plans that limit the ability of a legislature to substantially alter the generosity 
of the pension plan for state employees.  The majority of states have constitutional provisions 
that describe how their retirement plans are to be “funded, protected, managed, or governed” (US 
GAO 2008, p. 60).  However, RHI plans are not accorded similar status. Reductions in or the 
elimination of retiree health benefits may be constrained by collective bargaining contracts but in 
general, legislatures have more flexibility to reduce and modify retiree health benefit plans for 
public sector employees.   For example, the Ohio 2007 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 
asserts that “unlike pensions, the health care benefits OPERS (Ohio Public Employee Retirement 
System) provides (with the exception of Medicare B reimbursement) are not a guaranteed 
benefit….OPERS continues to make changes to the plan design of the health care benefits…” 
(Ohio 2007, p. 32). 
Many states have been amending their health plans for active workers and retirees in 
response to rising health care costs.  Changes include higher premiums, higher deductibles, 
higher co-payments, and more years of service to qualify for retiree health plans.  The ability to 
modify retiree health plans provides states with some options to moderate their projected costs 
and thus reduce the UAAL and ARC presented in these actuarial statements.   
Research Question 8.  If RHI can be made less generous for current and/or future retirees, what 






IV.  Retiree Health Insurance and Pensions 
Economists have devoted substantial resources in trying to explain the variation in 
pension plans across private sector employers. Other studies have examined how changes in the 
economic and regulatory environment have altered the structure of these retirement plans, and 
how pension plan characteristics affect work and saving behavior.
15  In contrast, very little 
attention has been paid to similar issues concerning RHI plans.  Perhaps the lack of research on 
RHI is due to the rapid decline in the incidence of these plans in the private sector since the 
establishment of new reporting standards for employers by the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board in 1989 (FASB 1989).
16  However, RHI plans cover virtually all full-time public sector 
employees and represent a significant component of labor cost to state and local governments. 
The dearth of research on the effects of RHI may be due to the lack of recognition of the 
importance of retiree health plans and the true liabilities associated with retiree health plans in 
the public sector.  Until recently, there was very little data on the cost and characteristics of these 
plans.   
Since both RHI and pensions are deferred compensation and provide benefits in 
retirement, we might consider both of these plans human resource tools that have the same 
objectives: attracting, retaining, and retiring quality workers.  We know of no study that has 
considered the joint use of RHI and pension plans to achieve the same HR objectives.  As a first 
attempt to assess the relationship of RHI and pension, we divide states into four groups based on 
the percent of the premium paid as reported in Table 2.  To approximate pension plan generosity, 
we use the replacement rate for a state employee who retirees at age 60 with 30 years of service 
in each state.  These replacement rates are based on the benefit formula that was in effect in each 
state in 2006.




see that pension generosity, as approximated by replacement rates, and RHI generosity, as 
approximated by percent of the premium paid, are positively related.  The mean pension 
replacement rate in the most generous RHI group (61%) is a statistically significant 6 percentage 
points higher than the mean in the least generous RHI group (55%).  The fact that states with 
more generous pensions also have more generous RHI plans implies that states are not shifting 
their benefits from one type of delayed compensation to another.  It also means that separately 
investigating the impact of RHI from pensions will be challenging, since the generosity of these 
plans positively covary.  
[Figure 2] 
Understanding the relationship between RHI and pension plans is of practical importance 
for a public sector employer’s fiscal planning.  For example, a more generous RHI plan should 
make workers on the margin more responsive to the retirement incentives imbedded in pension 
plans.  On the other hand, if employees do not have access to affordable health care in 
retirement, they may choose to postpone retirement until eligible for Medicare.  When public 
sector employers make choices regarding the structure and generosity of one type of post-
retirement benefit, it is essential for them to consider potential repercussions on the effectiveness 
and take-up rate of other post-retirement benefits offered by the employer. 
Research Question 9.  How are RHI plan and pension plan designs related in practice?  Do states 
with more generous pension plans also offer more generous retiree health plans? 
 
Research Question 10.  If the value or generosity of RHI plans were decreased due to program 
changes (such as an increase in the percent of the premium the retiree must pay), how might that 






V.  Value to Employees 
In order to better model the public sector labor market, economists need to develop a 
more detailed understanding of the role of RHI plans as a component of total compensation and 
how it affects job tenure and retirement decisions.  The value of RHI depends on factors such as 
the employee’s years of service, the employee’s age of retirement, and the generosity of the plan.    
Having employer-provided RHI also reduces the need for income compared to workers who 
expect to purchase health insurance in retirement.  The reduction in funds needed to purchase 
health insurance in retirement might affect lifetime saving, in particular, participation in and 
contributions to supplemental retirement plans offered by the employer. 
However, benefits are not free to workers; instead they are purchased by the employees 
because they accept lower wages as a quid pro quo for the employer providing the benefits.  
Benefits are compensation in-kind and are hard to trade for other forms of consumption.  In other 
words, it is impossible to accept health insurance, sell it to others, and then use these monies to 
purchase food and clothing.  In addition, the concept of vesting for RHI benefits is less clear and 
the legal guarantee of future benefits is less secure compared to pension plans.  Thus, it may be 
that the employer offers more benefits than the worker desires.  In this case, the reduction in 
wages associated with the benefit might lower the total value of employment for some workers.  
Benefits like pensions and retiree health plans typically have the greatest value to workers who 
stay for many years and provide much less value to those that remain with the employer for only 
a few years.  Because worker preferences differ, employers can develop and offer compensation 
packages that appeal to the types of employees they seek to hire.  Thus, retirement benefits may 
help recruit workers, reduce quit rates, and ultimately assist public sector employers in achieving 




Given the eligibility requirements for these RHI plans and the value of being able to 
remain in the state health plan, we should expect public sector employees to be more likely to 
remain with the employer in order to meet the needed years of service.  This effect should be 
especially strong as the worker approaches the qualifying number of years of service.  Once 
sufficient tenure has been achieved, workers should be more likely to retire. In conjunction with 
pension plans, the economic incentives imbedded in retiree health plans help to explain lower 
turnover rates, longer job tenures, and earlier retirements among public sector workers.  We 
know of no studies that tried to estimate the influence of retiree health plans in the public sector 
on job tenure and retirement decisions.  Empirically it is difficult to isolate the effects of RHI 
separately from those of pensions and other employee benefits.  With large datasets one could 
potentially identify employees’ retirement behavior relative to discrete jumps in the value of 
plans that do not exactly coincide with other retirement incentives.  In addition, given the 
variation in RHI plan characteristics, such as generosity and eligibility, state-level variation 
could be fruitfully exploited.  
There are numerous studies by economists estimating the impact of employer pensions on 
job tenure and the timing of retirement but only a few have examined the role of RHI on 
retirement decision (for example, Rogowski and Karoly, 2000; Blau and Gilleskie, 2001; 
Robinson 2009, Strumpf, 2009).  Economists have examined the role of health insurance for 
active workers on job mobility (for example, Gruber and Madrian, 1997, 2004) but these studies 
typically do not extend the analysis to potential coverage in retirement.  Most of these studies 
have focused on the general labor force or specific plans of private sector employers.     
It is interesting to note that relatively few states have adopted automatic enrollment for 




employee contributions.  In contrast, most private sector employers, who do not offer retiree 
health plans, do offer employer matches and increasingly employers are adopting automatic 
enrollment in these plans.  RHI plans are a valuable benefit and may represent significant cost 
savings in retirement.  As such, workers in the public sector may not require the same level of 
retirement savings relative to their private sector counterparts.  Public sector workers may 
already be ‘saving’ for retirement in the sense that they are forgoing higher salary now for a 
future stream of payments in the form of more generous employer-provided benefits in 
retirement.   
A better understanding of the value of retiree health insurance would help public 
employers develop a more comprehensive approach to their retirement policies.  For example, 
should a governmental employer that provides a 100 percent health insurance subsidy to retirees 
offer a less generous pension plan or avoid offering supplemental retirement savings plans that 
include automatic enrollment or an employer match?  
Research Question 11.  Do employees recognize, understand, and value their retiree health 
insurance benefit?  How valuable are RHI plans to different types of workers such as primary 
versus secondary earners, early versus mid-career workers, or high versus low wage workers? 
 
Research Question 12.  How does RHI affect turnover rates in the public sector? Does the 
provision of RHI encourage earlier retirement for public sector workers?  Do public sector 
workers covered by more generous plans respond more strongly to the incentives imbedded in 
the plans? 
 
Research Question 13.  Do workers covered by RHI save less than comparable workers whose 
employers do not offer such a plan?  Are workers covered by retiree health plans less likely to 
enroll in supplemental retirement plans and if the participation do their contribute less to these 
plans?  Are public sector employees covered by RHI more likely to opt out of automatic 






VI.   Future of Public Sector Retiree Health Insurance 
Analysis of the actuarial statements for RHI plans offered by states indicates that some 
states face substantial future liabilities associated with these programs, that relatively few states 
have enacted legislation establishing trust funds to help finance these future costs of retiree 
health plans, and that even fewer are making use of laws that allow funding.  These substantial 
liabilities pose a serious financial problem for many states.  These unfunded liabilities will 
confront policy makers with difficult choices in the future.  In 2006, the annual cost to state and 
local governments for retiree health plans averaged about two percent of employee salaries.  If 
public sector employers continue to pay for these benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis, the cost of 
RHI is projected to rise to five percent of payroll in 2050 (GAO, 2008).  As annual costs rises, 
the ability to finance RHI programs may cause other priorities to be unmet and the overhang of 
billion dollar retiree health insurance liabilities may influence future bond ratings.
18   
In the near future, states with high unfunded liabilities will need to either increase 
revenues to meet these costs or they must reduce the benefits they provide to retired workers.  
There are many options that public employers can adopt to accomplish either of these challenges.  
Increasing revenues can be achieved by raising any of a variety of taxes or through the sale of 
public assets.  If such financing is used in conjunction with an irrevocable trust, new funds 
deposited into such a trust can yield returns on investments that can reduce the need for future 
tax increases.
 19   New revenues to support RHI can also be generated by reducing other 
government expenditures and transferring these unused funds into the trust for retiree health 
insurance.   
Alternatively, states and other public employers can attempt to reduce expenditures on 




workers and retirees through higher premiums, co-payments, and deductibles.  Employers can 
also increase the years of service required for eligibility in these programs, thus reducing the 
number of eligible participants.  States and local governments might also consider the total 
elimination of retiree health plans, as was seen in the private sector.  Another option for states 
might be to shift from defined benefit type plans to retirement saving account plans where 
workers can contribution to a fund that could be used for health care expenses in retirement.  
However, recall that some state governments may face constitutional and statutory restrictions on 
eliminating these plans altogether, which may further complicate the strategy of reducing 
liabilities by restricting the benefits provided.
 20   
Finally, states may adopt various methods to address the actual cost of health benefits.   
Such techniques include more effective delivery of health care to retirees, proper and efficient 
coordination with Medicare and the use of health improvement programs such as wellness 
programs to reduce the utilization of medical care by their retirees.  In response to GASB 45 and 
the financial pressures associated with health insurance promises, states are considering many of 
these options.  Thus, policy changes within states may limit the actual future cost of retiree 
health plans in the public sector.  Along the same lines, national health care reform could directly 
affect state RHI plans through reductions in the cost (or cost growth) of health care.  Expansions 
of Medicare coverage and/or generosity should also impact public sector RHI plans by shifting 
some costs from states to the federal government.  On the other hand, a policy change such as an 
increase in the age of eligibility for Medicare to match the new Social Security normal retirement 
ages could negatively affect state and local governments who would then need to cover retirees 




As one example, in the 2010 health reform law one provision gives individuals that are 
under age 65 and living in households at 400 percent or below the federal poverty level 
eligibility for subsidies to purchase health insurance after 2014.
21  If the health care reform does 
lead to the development of health insurance exchanges or other sources of affordable individual 
health insurance, this may reduce the pressure on public sector employers as some individuals 
(although perhaps those with the lowest costs) will opt not to use their employer-provided RHI.  
How this and other provisions of the health care reform ultimately affects the retiree health 
insurance liabilities faced by state and local governments remains to be seen. 
 
Research Question 14.  How will any national health care reforms, such as the 2010 legislation, 
affect public sector RHI? 
 
Research Question 15. Will rising RHI plan costs hinder governments’ abilities to provide goods 
and services to their citizens at some point in the future? 
 
VII.  Conclusions 
Throughout this analysis of RHI in the public sector, we have posed a series of important 
economic and policy questions.  Unfortunately, the data necessary to answer these questions is 
not readily available.  Relatively few nationally representative data sets contain sufficient 
number of state and local employees to address these questions and surveys often lack important 
details of these plans, such as the cost to the retiree of remaining in the plan and the eligibility 
conditions of continued enrollment in the health insurance plan.   One method of assessing the 
importance of RHI might be to obtain data from individual state systems and compare turnover 
rates and retirement ages under a system where the employer pays the entire insurance premium 




As employers of a relatively large number of workers, state and local governments must 
develop optimal human resource management policies that enable them to hire, retain, motivate, 
and ultimately retire high quality workers.  Public sector employers need to maintain a workforce 
that can produce and deliver the goods and services demanded by their citizens at a cost that 
taxpayers are willing to pay.  Historically, this has been achieved by public employers offering 
more generous retirement benefits than comparable private sector workers receive.  Virtually all 
full-time state and local employees are covered by both a pension plan and a retiree health plan 
while coverage rates are much lower in the private economy.  Economists have devoted 
considerable resources toward trying to understand the role of employer pensions with most of 
these studies focusing on private sector plans.  In contrast, economic analysis of retiree health 
plans is virtually nonexistent.  New empirical and theoretical research is needed to assist public 
managers in developing optimal retirement policies and reforming current systems.   
It is also important for policy makers, managers, and researchers to consider the joint 
effects of pension and retiree health plans.  From an administrative standpoint, these two 
important and costly benefits are often overseen by separate governmental units when a 
coordinated policy is needed.  Changes in pension policies that affect turnover rates and 
retirement decisions will also affect the utilization of retiree health insurance.  Under pressure 
from rising costs, public managers and policy makers must be aware of labor market responses to 
modifications in retirement plans.  Additional research is needed to help governmental leaders 
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Figure 1:  Average UAAL per Capita (measured in dollars) by the Percent of 
Premium Paid by the State. 
 
Sources:  UAAL calculations from data gathered from state actuarial reports.  The population figures are 
from 2005 Census population estimates.  The percent of the premium paid is from the 2007 GAO report 
with the exception of Washington and West Virginia, which we modified to be 50-99.  There are 49 states 
represented in these data. 
Figure 2: The Relationship between Pension Replacement Rates and RHI Percent of the 
Premium Paid 
 
Sources:  The percent of the premium paid is from the 2007 GAO report with the exception of Washington 
and West Virginia, which we modified to be 50-99.  Replacement rates are calculated using the pension 
benefit formula for a person retiring at age 60 with 30 years of service.  Due to missing information on 
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Table 1. State Liabilities for Retiree Health Insurance, Summary Information 
 
  Source: Clark and Morrill (2010); 
Individual State Actuarial Reports 
Source:  Pew (2010); Comprehensive 
Annual Financial Reports (CAFR) 












Alabama  3,104  1,173   2006  15,549  1,314  2007 or 2008 
Alaska 3,139  N/A  2007  4,032  558  2007  or  2008 
Arizona  438  104   2007  808  146  2007 or 2008 
Arkansas 1,224  167  2008  1,822  170  2007  or  2008 
California  47,878  3,593   2007  62,463  5,179  2007 or 2008 
Colorado 1,033  71  2006  1,127  82  2007  or  2008 
Connecticut 21,681 1,597  2006 26,018  1,719  2007  or  2008 
Delaware  3,100  286   2005  5,410  465  2007 or 2008 
Florida 3,082  201  2008  3,082  201  2007  or  2008 
Georgia  15,035  1,262   2007  18,322  1,583  2007 or 2008 
Hawaii 9,679  705  2007  10,791  822  2007  or  2008 
Idaho  362  34   2007  489  45  2007 or 2008 
Illinois  24,210  1,743   2008  39,947  1,192  2007 or 2008 
Indiana 442  46  2008  442  46  2007  or  2008 
Iowa 220  23  2006  404  43  2007  or  2008 
Kansas 293  34  2008  317  16  2007  or  2008 
Kentucky 4,833  397  2007  11,660  1,051  2007  or  2008 
Louisiana 19,609  2069  2007  12,543  1168  2007  or  2008 
Maine  4,756  356   2007  4,348  164  2007 or 2008 
Maryland  14,543  1,114   2007  14,723  1,086  2007 or 2008 
Massachusetts  13,287  1,062   2006  15,032  839  2007 or 2008 
Michigan 13,925  3,364  2007  39,879  3,946  2007  or  2008 
Minnesota 565 56  2006  1,011  110  2007  or  2008 
Mississippi 570 43 2008  570 44  2007  or  2008 
Missouri 2,186  159  2006  2,852  262  2007  or  2008 
Montana 449  58  2008  632  59  2007  or  2008 
Nebraska N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  2007  or  2008 
Nevada  2,295  273   2007  2,211  287  2007 or 2008 
New Hampshire  2,859  235  2007  3,054  269  2007 or 2008 
New Jersey  68,834  5,840   2007 68,900  5,022  2007  or  2008 
New Mexico  4,110  383   2007 2,946 267  2007  or  2008 
New York  49,663  3,810   2006  56,286  4,133  2007 or 2008 
North Carolina  23,786  2,390  2005  28,742  2,459  2007 or 2008 
North Dakota  31  4  2007  81  6  2007 or 2008 
Ohio  18,723  2,046   2007  27,026  2,717  2007 or 2008 
Oklahoma 814 87  2007  360  48  2007  or  2008 
Oregon  264  34   2007  610  67  2007 or 2008 
Pennsylvania  8,659  720   2008  9,957  824  2007 or 2008 
Rhode Island  480  41   2005  788  46  2007 or 2008 
South Carolina  10,048  777   2006  8,638  762  2007 or 2008 
South Dakota  76  9   2008  76  9  2007 or 2008 
Tennessee  2,146  187   2007  1,747  168  2007 or 2008 
Texas 17,675  1,482  2007  28,612  2,237  2007  or  2008 
Utah 569  54    2007  673  54  2006 
Vermont  1,419  113   2006  1,615  108  2007 or 2008 
Virginia 1,616  123   2,621  541  2007  or  2008 
Washington  7,495  634   2007  7,902  683  2007 or 2008 
West Virginia  7,761  824   2007  6,108  175  2007 or 2008 
Wisconsin 1,473  162 2008  1,700  205  2006 



















Rate Used in 
Report 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Alabama 3,104  683    50-99  5.0 
Alaska 3,139  4,689    100  8.25 
Arizona 438  73  X  1-49  8.0 
Arkansas 1,224  441    50-99  5.25 
California 47,878  1,330    100  4.5 
Colorado 1,033  221  X  50-99  8.5 
Connecticut 21,681  6,218    50-99  4.5 
Delaware 3,100  3,688  X  50-99  8.0 
Florida 3,082  173  X  1-49  4.0 
Georgia 15,035  1,650  X  50-99  6.0 
Hawaii 9,679  7,635  X  100  5.0 
Idaho 362  253  X  0  5.0 
Illinois 24,210  1,903  X  100  4.5 
Indiana 442  70    0  4.5 
Iowa 220  74  X  0  4.5 
Kansas 293  106  X  0  3.85 
Kentucky 4,833  1,158   100 4.5 
Louisiana 19,609  4,361  X  50-99  4.0 
Maine 4,756  3,624  X  100  4.5 
Maryland 14,543  2,609  X  50-99  4.25 
Massachusetts 13,287  2,066    50-99  4.5 
Michigan 13,925  1,377    50-99  4.0 
Minnesota 565  110    0 4.25 
Mississippi 570  196  X  0  4.5 
Missouri 2,186  377  X  50-99  4.5 
Montana 449  479    0  4.25 
Nebraska 0  0    0  N/A 
Nevada 2,295  952  X  50-99  4.0 
New Hampshire  2,859  2,193  X  100  4.5 
New Jersey  68,834  7,950  X  100  4.5 
New Mexico  4,110  2,144  X  100  5.0 
New York  49,663  2,578  X  50-99  4.155 
North Carolina  23,786  2,740  X  100  4.25 
North Dakota  31  48    1-49  5.0 
Ohio 18,723  1,633    100  6.5 
Oklahoma 814  230  X  1-49  3.5 
Oregon 264  72  X  0  4.5 
Pennsylvania 8,659 700    100  8.5 
Rhode Island  480  449  X  100  8.25 
South Carolina  10,048  2,361  X  50-99  4.5 
South Dakota  76  97  X  0  3.0 
Tennessee 2,146  358  50-99  4.5 
Texas 17,675  773    100  6.0 
Utah 569  227  X  50-99  8.0 
Vermont 1,419  2,289  X  50-99  3.75 
Virginia 1,616  213  X  1-49  7.5 
Washington 7,495  1,195 X 50-99^ 4.5 
West Virginia  7,761  4,298  X  50-99^  4.5 
Wisconsin 1,473  265  X  0  4.0 




Sources:  Authors’ calculations from data gathered from state actuarial reports.  Population figures are from 2005 
Census population estimates and percent premium paid is from the 2007 GAO report.  The discount rate is for the 
state plan covering general state employees. 
^ The percent premium paid for Washington and West Virginia was modified to be 50-99. 
 
Table 3.  Sensitivity of UAAL to Inflation Rate 
  UAAL (in millions of dollars) 
  -1 Percent  Baseline Inflation Rate  +1 Percent 
Florida                  2,659    3,082  3,613 
Hawaii 8,187  9,679 11,597 
Idaho  302 362 432 
Maryland  13,128 14,543 16,226 
Massachusetts  11,282 13,287 15,884 
North  Dakota  28 31 34 
Oklahoma  745 814 895 
Source:  Actuarial reports of various states 
 
 
Table 4. Assets and Funding Ratios of State Retiree Health Plans 









Arizona 1,605,000,000  1,167,000,000  438,000,000  72.7 
Alaska  6,300,795,000 3,161.956,000 3,138,839,000  50.2 
Oregon  522,900,000 258,600,000 264,300,000 49.5 
Ohio  30,748,000,000 12,025,000,000 18,723,000,000  39.1 
Colorado 1,247,950,000  214,816,000  1,033,134,000  17.2 
Kentucky 5,706,198,036  872,708,414  4,833,489,622  15.3 
Virginia 1,813,158,000  197,514,000  1,616,000,000  10.9 
New Mexico  4,264,180,967  154,538,668  4,109,642,299  6.6 
North Carolina  23,925,138,742  139,174,878  23,785,963,864  0.6 
Delaware  3,132,000,000 26,000,000 3,106,000,000 0.01 
Source:  Actuarial reports of various states and author calculations. 




Table 5. UAAL by Discount Rate 
  Discount Rate (Percent)  UAAL (in millions of dollars) 
California  4.5 
6.125   




Connecticut  4.5   
4.7    
6.08   





Florida  4.0    
7.75    
3,082 
1,918 
Georgia 4.5     
6.0    
19,559 
15,035 
Hawaii  5.0    
8.0    
9,678 
6,270 








Maine  4.5   
7.5   
4,756 
3,234 
Maryland  4.25    
7.75    
14,543 
9,002 
Massachusetts  4.5    
8.25    
13,287 
7,562 












New Hampshire  4.5    
8.5    
2,859 
1,550 
New Jersey  4.5   
8.25    
68,834 
37,307 
North Dakota  5.0    
8.0    
31 
24 
Oklahoma  3.5    
7.5    
815 
586 
Oregon  4.5    
7.5    
309 
238 
Rhode Island  5.0    
7.0    




South Carolina  4.5   
6.0   










3.75    
8.0    
1,419 
402 
Wyoming  4.0    
8.5    
72 
41 






Table 6: Factors Associated with High Levels of Unfunded Actuarially Accrued Liabilities 
Per Capita  
Dependent variable:  Log UAAL Per Capita, Mean $1,622 
  Log UAAL Per Capita 
Log State Budget   0.043 [0.149] 
Share of Labor Force  in State and Local Gov.  10.497 [3.560]** 
Share of Pub Employees in Collective Bargaining Unit  1.761 [1.021]+ 
Pension Funding Ratio  -0.005 [0.008] 
Avg. Monthly Salary Full-Time State Employees (thousands)  0.060 [0.307] 
Discount Rate (%)  -0.210 [0.083]* 
Teachers Included Dummy  0.382 [0.242] 
Pay 1-49% Premium  0.263 [0.445] 
Pay 50-99% Premium  2.419 [0.311]** 
Pay 100% Premium  2.741 [0.364]** 
Constant  2.866 [1.778] 
   
Observations  49 
R-squared  0.790 
 





                                                 
1 See, for example, Fronstin (2005, 2010) and Buchmueller, Johnson, and Lo Sasso (2006).  Clark, Ghent, 
and Headen (1994) provide an early assessment of the key determinants of the decline in the incidence of 
RHI in the private sector. 
2 We would like to thank Joseph Newhouse for providing information on how the structure of Medicare 
led to the development of retiree health insurance as a post-retirement benefit for employees. 
3 Details of the approved accounting standards for retiree health insurance plans are contained in GASB 
(2004 a, b).   
4 An exception is Clark (2010) which surveys the retiree health plans for teachers in each of the states.    
5 UAAL per capita is defined as the UAAL divided by the state population.  Population figures are from 
2005 Census population estimates available at: http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-
EST2007-01.xls, [accessed February 27, 2009]. 
6 Many states have a graded level of premium subsidies with more years of service being associated with 
a greater percentage of the premium being paid by the state.  For example, in California, employees with 
under 10 years of service pay the entire RHI premium.  For retirees with 10 years of service, the state 
pays 50 percent of the RHI premium. The state-paid  portion of the premium increases by 5 percent for 
each additional year of service up to 20 years of service.  The state pays 100 percent of the premium for 
retirees with 20 or more years of service. 
7 Note that the percent premium paid for Washington and West Virginia was modified from the original 
GAO (2007) classification to be 50-99 upon a close reading of the actuarial report.  See Clark and Morrill 
(2010 forthcoming) for further discussion. 
8 Chernew et al. (2009) argue that health care spending and Medicare spending are not likely to continue 
to grow at their current rate since this would effectively leave little room for growth in non-health care 
consumption. 
9 Of course a lower UAAL also implies a lower ARC.  Deputy Comptroller of New York State, Thomas 
Sanzillo (2007) testified before the New York State Assembly that the liability of the state (including 
SUNY) associated with its retiree health plans was approximately $47 billion and that the annual required 
contribution was $3.7 billion if the state continued with no pre-funding.  However, he then reported that if 
the state committed to fully fund its retiree health obligations, the ARC would be only $2.4 billion based 
on using a discount rate of 8.0 percent.  This latter value represented $1.1 billion to support current 
benefits payable and $1.3 billion in contributions to a fund to support future benefits. 
10 GASB (2010) has established a study commission to consider amending its standards concerning the 
appropriate discount rate to use for public pensions. 
11 Population figures are from 2005 Census population estimates available at: 
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2007-01.xls, [accessed February 27, 2009].  
12 The state budget is calculated by taking the state share of state and local expenditure from 
http://sourcebook.governing.com/subtopicresults.jsp?ind=696 and multiplying that by the total state and 
local expenditure in 2005 from http://sourcebook.governing.com/subtopicresults.jsp?ind=695, [accessed 
February 27, 2009].  
13 The share of workers in the public sector is provided by Hirsch and Macpherson (2003).   Our measure 




                                                                                                                                                             
14 This variable is calculated by dividing the state’s 2007 March payroll number by the total number of 
state employees, both from the Census of State Governments, http://www.census.gov/govs/state/ 
[accessed January 22, 2009]. 
15 Clark and McDermed (1990), Gustmann and Steinmeier (1992), and Ippolito (1995) examine the 
determinants of the shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans while Munnell et al 
(2007) discuss why defined benefit plans continue to be the norm in the public sector.  In a series of 
papers, Laibson and Madrian and their colleagues have examined the impact of defaults and the framing 
of choices of saving behavior (see their paper at this conference and references therein). 
16 Fronstin (2005, 2010) and Buchmueller, et al. (2006) report trends in coverage of retiree health 
insurance plans.  
17 For more details on the calculation of the pension replacement ratio, see Clark, Craig, and Sabelhaus 
(2011 forthcoming). 
18 Moody’s Investors Service (2005) states on page 1, “Moody’s does not anticipate that the liability 
disclosures will cause immediate rating adjustments of a broad scale” and that “Moody’s therefore will 
exclude OPEB liabilities from calculations of state or local debt burdens, but include them as a factor in 
the overall credit assessment of an issuer.  This practice is consistent with Moody’s approach to municipal 
pension liabilities.”  
19 Standard & Poor’s (2007) discusses the possibilities of a different prefunding strategy, the use of OPEB 
obligation bonds. 
20 After the Financial Accounting Standard Boards required private employers to report retiree health 
insurance liabilities in the same manner as GASB 45, there was been a sharp decline in the proportion of 
employers offering retiree health plans.  The Kaiser Family Foundation (2006) reports that in 1988 before 
the adoption of the FASB standards, 66 percent of employers with 20 or more employees offered retiree 
health plans.  After the standards were issued the proportion of private employers offering such plans 
dropped to 46 percent in 1991 and further to 36 percent in 1993. 
21 We would like to thank Joseph Newhouse for bringing this provision to our attention. 